EUROPE’S WORLD
Summer 2010

Tsarist and Soviet ambitions are long dead. We all face common threats now

by Vagif Guseynov

Not a few policymakers and analysts like to point to Moscow as the chief troublemaker, and Janusz Onyszkiewicz apparently sees President Medvedev’s eurosecurity initiative as a continuation of tsarist Russia’s policies of the late 19th century and those of the Soviet Union thereafter. But this sort of assessment of the Medvedev offer is superficial, and fails fully recognise both European and global realities. The present European security system based on the interactions between NATO, OSCE and the EU is comfortable for both Washington and Brussels. In practice, building up the post-Cold War eurosecurity system boiled down to NATO enlargement. But a NATOcentric ideology doesn’t adapt well to the new geopolitical realities. It creates an unbalanced system in which Russia was set to become the most seriously weakened segment element. Furthermore, a NATO dominated system is clearly a poor instrument for maintaining European security now that it is facing new threats and challenges that are not of a military nature.
So what should one make of Mr. Onyszkiewicz’s critical remark concerning the Russian EST initiative? First, Russia – like the Euro-Atlantic community – is unable to cope singlehandedly with all the threats it is facing today. The only option is to solve them together, and that requires a strong new legal basis. Second. No one in Russia is going to belittle the security role of the United States in Europe and globally. Although the U.S. may be losing some of its influence in the world arena, it would be nonsense to talk of a new Euro-Atlantic security architecture without the involvement of the U.S. Russia’s leaders are not so naïve as to challenge America’s superpower status. My third point is that while no one questions NATO’s leading role in maintaining the security of its members, nor its influence on other European countries’ security, that’s no reason to misrepresent Russia’s position. To say that Russia is seeking the right to veto NATO’s security decisions is either a deliberate attempt to deceive European public opinion or a failure to grasp what Russian politicians and diplomats have repeatedly been saying. Russia’s right to comment on NATO security measures needs no explanation, and it seems only natural that Moscow should wish to voice its concerns so they can be taken into consideration when NATO is taking decisions relevant to Russia’s own security.
The fourth point I want to make is that there are absolutely no grounds for saying that Russia tries to use its bi-lateral contacts with EU member states to create disunity within the European Union. One cannot avoid bi-lateral contacts when addressing practical matters in the fields of, say, security, economic policy or energy. In the final analysis, it is an internal EU matter how it should to build up its foreign policy, with Russia having neither the right, nor the intention of interfering.
Modern-day Russia is not the USSR, but along with Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and other CIS countries it has its own interests within the post-Soviet space and is going to stand up for them. It is wrong to interpret these legitimate and open activities as Moscow’s imperial ambitions. The new states that have established themselves within the territory of the former USSR are not puppets and follow independent policies of their own. They consider Russia to be an important partner, but not their only one.
Some people fear that because Russia recognises the importance of close security co-operation within a U.S.-EU-Russia triangle it has secret hopes of remodeling this as U.S.-Russia+EU. I think this is a naïve and nonsensical idea because it suggests the EU could be made the object of political manipulations.
Whether or not a new treaty is needed, Janusz Onyszkiewicz’s hardline position appears to be that there should be no legally binding agreement whatsoever. The acceptable maximum for the Western partners would be some OSCE-framed political declaration to which the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organisation), CIS and NATO might be signatories. That, he suggests, should soothe Russia and make it more proactive in resolving problems that are of interest to NATO and EU. But what some might see as an elegant way of burying the Russian security initiative no way addresses the essential all-European security problems.
It is time that others should understand that Russia is not, as many think, fired by ambitions rooted in the pain of a lost empire. Europe, including Russia, is along with the rest of the world on the threshold of a new era of insecurity that can only be met by joint efforts. The question is not Russia’s place in the present euro-security system, but the modernisation of this system. Surely the time has come for all of us to honestly answer the question: Is today’s security architecture capable of defending us against existing and prospective threats?

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